We consider AC electrical systems where each electrical device has a power demand expressed as a complex number, and there is a limit on the magnitude of total power supply. Motivated by this scenario, we introduce the complex-demand knapsack problem (C-KP), a new variation of the traditional knapsack problem, where each item is associated with a demand as a complex number, rather than a real number often interpreted as weight or size of the item. While keeping the same goal as to maximize the sum of values of the selected items, we put the capacity limit on the magnitude of the sum of satisfied demands.
INTRODUCTION
Most studies of power allocation only consider devices without minimum power requirements; we focus on those with such requirements, such as electric vehicles (EVs) charging, which will not produce any value unless it is charged enough to travel a threshold distance. Gerding et al. [4] studies online electric vehicle charging by expressing power demands as real numbers. However, in alternating current (AC) electrical systems, alternating power is provided. In this paper, we study electrical devices with a power demand expressed as a complex number d = d R + id I . Although d I = 0 for purely resistive appliances; devices with capacitive or inductive components have non-zero imaginary part d I [5] . In power allocation, due to the constraint of power generation, there is a limit C on the magnitude of the total power supply, i.e., the magnitude of the sum of satisfied demands should not exceed C. Since only a limited number of devices can be served and different devices produce different values when they receive enough power to work, there arises a natural allocation problem: we want to select a subset of devices to provide power subject to the power limit constraint such that the total value produced is maximized.
Moreover, in a multi-agent setting (e.g., in future smart grid, where intelligent devices are automatically controlled by agents), the demand and value of each device are private knowledge of an individual agent. The power allocation algorithm collects the input information from each agent, and based on that, computes which subset of demands to satisfy. Depending on the (publicly known) algorithm, each selfish agent may misreport his demand or value to the algorithm in order to get selected.
Naturally, to guarantee a good realization of our optimization goal (here, maximizing social welfare, the total value of selected items), we would like to design the algorithm in a way that incentivizes all agents to report their true information. This falls into the study of Algorithmic mechanism design [9, 10] , a burgeoning research area that deals with designing algorithms (called mechanisms here) for settings where inputs are controlled by selfish agents. Each agent is modeled to strategize so as to maximize his utility, a quantity that indicates his overall benefit. A mechanism is incentive compatible, or simply truthful, if no agent has an incentive to misreport. A general approach in mechanism design is to enforce payment on each agent to adjust his utility so that truthtelling always maximizes his utility. Now formally, we have the following mechanism design problem: we have a set K of distinct agents where each agent k ∈ K owns an item with a positive value v k and a complex-valued de-
k . Given capacity C > 0, our task is to choose a subset S ⊆ K of agents to satisfy their demands and assign each agent k a nonnegative payment p k . The goal is to elicit true inputs and maximize the total value of selected items subject to the constraint that | k∈S d k | ≤ C. Here we limit our attention to the case where d Usually, the design of a truthful mechanism is composed of two steps: first, we solve the pure algorithmic problem; second, we identify certain condition that guarantees the existence of incentive compatible payments and make it satisfied by our algorithm.
We follow this path for our problem. Our algorithmic problem is a winner determination optimization problem; we call it the complex-demand knapsack problem (C-KP), as it turns out to be an interesting new variation of the traditional knapsack problem [6] . In the original one-dimensional knapsack problem (1-KP), the demand of an item is simply a nonnegative real number, often interpreted as the weight or size of the item. The "knapsack", with fixed real-valued capacity to hold the items, represents the limited resource. The multi-dimensional generalization, the m-dimensional knapsack problem (m-KP), captures the settings where there are m independent resource constraints on the m dimensions (independent features) of the demands. 1-KP can model the power allocation in direct current (DC) electrical systems, where power demands can be expressed as real numbers, but fails for AC systems, where each demand is a two-dimensional vector. Our problem is also different from 2-KP since our capacity constraint is a quadratic one (on the magnitude of the total satisfiable demand), rather than two independent linear constraints in 2-KP. Moreover, it is natural to modify our problem by including these two linear constraints (on the real and imaginary part of the total satisfiable demand respectively), and thus introduce the generalized complexdemand knapsack problem (GC-KP). In fact, many power generators do have all three constraints of GC-KP.
It is well-known that 1-KP is NP-hard, and our complex-demand variations include it as a special case when we set all d
Hence we are interested in good polynomial-time approximation algorithms. In this work, we present an algorithm with constant 1/2 − approximation ratio for both C-KP and GC-KP, and show the inapproximability of C-KP by FPTAS (unless P = NP), based on its connections to well-studied 1-KP, 2-KP and 3-KP. There is still a gap to close, and we conjecture that C-KP admits a PTAS.
As to the incentive part, the difficulty lies in the following: VCG mechanisms [9] are both social welfare maximizing and truthful; however, they become computationally infeasible when computing optimal social welfare is computationally hard, as in our setting. Worse still, using algorithms approximating maximum social welfare may not preserve truthfulness. To obtain truthful and efficient mechanisms with a good approximation ratio, a leading approach is through "monotonization": First prove that a certain notion of monotonicity suffices for the existence of incentive compatible payments and then design or adapt an existing algorithm to be monotone. This has been successfully applied to problem settings with single-parameter [1] and single-minded agents [8] , with efficiently computable payments specified; in fact, for the former, monotonicity is necessary as well, which justifies the necessity of monotonization. An additional nice property of the specified payments is that they guarantee nonnegative utilities for all agents, which, in mechanism design, is an important desired property called individual rationality ensuring voluntary participation of the agents.
For the knapsack problem, if both demand and value of an item are private information, which is the case we investigate here, we do not have single-parameter agents. However, all variations we consider are special cases of single-minded agents, each has a single object d k in mind, gets value v k if he is assigned an object no worse than d k and 0 otherwise. For example, in our power system setting, the power demand d k is the single object the kth agent desires, and the value v k is produced as long as the power he receives is ≥ d k (according to comparisons between complex numbers). The monotonicity property for single-minded agents looks natural and reasonable: If an agent is selected with certain demand and value, he should remain selected with a lower demand and a higher value, while the inputs of other agents are fixed. Although this property easily holds for exact optimization, it may not hold for approximation algorithms. For C-KP, we succeed in monotonizing our constant approximation algorithm, based on an existing monotone FPTAS for 1-KP in [2] , and thus achieving incentive compatibility.
Related Work
The knapsack problem has many variations with respect to divisibility of items, copies of items, dimensions of constraints, etc [6] . In this work, we restrict our attention to the NPhard one-dimensional knapsack problem (1-KP) where each indivisible item has only one single copy, and its multi-dimensional generalization, the m-dimensional knapsack problem (m-KP).
For 1-KP, there is a pseudo-polynomial time algorithm using dynamic programming achieving exact optimization when all item values are integers. There is a simple fully polynomial-time approximation scheme (FPTAS), which scales and rounds the item values and then applies the pseudo-polynomial time algorithm on small integer values [6] . However, this FPTAS is not monotone, since the scale factor involves the maximum item value. Briest et al. [2] monotonized it, by performing the same procedure with a series of different scaling factors irrelevant to item values and taking the best solution out of them. Hence 1-KP admits an incentive compatible FPTAS.
As to m-KP with m ≥ 2, there is a polynomial-time approximation scheme (PTAS) by Frieze and Clarke [3] based on the integer programming formulation, but it is not evident to see whether it is monotone. On the other hand, 2-KP is already inapproximable by FPTAS unless P = NP, by a reduction from EQUIPARTITION [6] . In fact, there is no efficient polynomial-time approximation scheme (EPTAS) for 2-KP unless W[1] = FPT (See [7] ).
Our Results
We initiate the study of the complex-demand knapsack problem (C-KP) and its hybrid with 2-KP, the generalized complex-demand knapsack problem (GC-KP).
In Section 3, we present an approximation algorithm for C-KP, which projects all demand vectors onto the π/4 line and uses an approximation algorithm for 1-KP as a subroutine. Since 1-KP admits an FPTAS, we achieve approximation ratio 1/2 − for any > 0, with running time polynomial in 1/ and the size of the input. Moreover, the algorithm can be monotonized, as shown in Section 4, due to the existence of the monotone FPTAS for 1-KP.
On the other hand, in Section 5, we complete our study of C-KP by providing an inapproximability result. We prove that there is no FPTAS for C-KP unless P = NP, through a modification of the reduction from EQUIPARTITION for 2-KP.
Finally, for GC-KP, the inapproximability result is inherited since it includes C-KP as a special case. We also come up with an approximation algorithm by applying the same idea as for C-KP, but we have to use a PTAS for 3-KP as a subroutine (Section 6). Again we achieve approximation ratio 1/2 − for any > 0, but the running time is only guaranteed to be polynomial in the size of the input. Regarding monotonization, a similar trick as in Section 4 would work for GC-KP, if we could find a good monotone approximation algorithm for 3-KP.
PRELIMINARIES

The Knapsack Problems
Here we give the integer programming formulation of the knapsack problems discussed in this paper. The decision of an allocation algorithm is specified by indicator variables x k ∈ {0, 1} for item k ∈ K, which has a simple correspondence to the selected subset of items: S = {k ∈ K : x k = 1}. We will switch back to the subset representation in later sections for convenience of illustration.
The one-dimensional knapsack problem (1-KP) is defined as:
• K is a set of items;
• v k is the positive value of item k if its demand is satisfied;
• d k is the nonnegative real-valued demand of item k;
• C is the positive real-valued capacity on the total satisfiable demand;
• x k indicates whether item k is selected: x k = 1 means that the demand of item k is satisfied, and 0 otherwise.
1-KP can be generalized to multi-dimensions. The m-dimensional knapsack problem (m-KP) is defined as:
• C j is the positive real-valued capacity on the total satisfiable demand in dimension j.
Each m-KP is a linear integer program, and m-KP is a special case of (m + 1)-KP for all m. We are especially interested in 1-KP, 2-KP and 3-KP, whose previous results will be used to achieve ours. In particular, the two-dimensional knapsack problem (2-KP) can also be formulated in terms of complex-valued demands:
I k are the nonnegative real part and imaginary part respectively of the complex-valued demand d k of item k;
• C R , C I are the positive real-valued capacities on the real part and imaginary part respectively of the total satisfiable demand.
Our study concerns the capacity constraint on the magnitude of the total satisfiable demand, which is no longer linear. We formulate the complex-demand knapsack problem (C-KP) as follows:
• C is the positive real-valued capacity on the magnitude of the total satisfiable demand.
Combining the constraints of C-KP and 2-KP results in the following generalized complex-valued knapsack problem (GC-KP):
Approximation Algorithm
For knapsack problems, given a solution represented by the selected subset of items S ⊆ K, we denote the total value of selected items by v(S) = k∈S v k . Let S * denote an optimal solution. For our value maximization objective, an algorithm is called a ρ-approximation, if on each input, the output S of the algorithm satisfies v(S) ≥ ρ · v(S * ). Since the knapsack problems considered in this paper are NP-hard, one looks for polynomial-time algorithms with good approximation ratio ρ.
It is desirable to find constant approximation algorithms with ρ as close to 1 as possible; stronger than that are algorithms whose approximation ratio can be arbitrarily close to 1:
One such candidate is a polynomial-time approximation scheme (PTAS), which is a (1 − )-approximation algorithm for any > 0. The running time of a PTAS is polynomial in the input size for every fixed , but the exponent of the polynomial might depend on 1/ . One way of addressing this is to define the efficient polynomial-time approximation scheme (EPTAS), whose running time is the multiplication of a function in 1/ and a polynomial in the input size independent of . An even stronger notion is a fully polynomial-time approximation scheme (FPTAS), which requires the running time to be polynomial in both the input size and 1/ .
In this work, we design constant 1/2 − approximation algorithms for C-KP and GC-KP based on the FPTAS for 1-KP and PTAS for 3-KP respectively.
Incentive Compatibility
In this subsection, we give a formal model of mechanism design with single-minded agents based on our C-KP problem setting, state the monotonicity condition, and specify the incentive compatible payments under it. Single-minded agents are first introduced by Lehmann et al. [8] , and here we essentially present the model described in [2] . Readers can refer to [9, 10] for a formal definition of the general setting of mechanism design.
We are given a set K of agents, where agent k controls item k. The demand and value of item k is agent k's private information, which is called his type, denoted by t k = (d k , v k ). Each agent k is single-minded: he has the single demand d k in mind, and enjoys value v k if and only if his demand is satisfied.
Here, with selfish behaviors, satisfying the demand of an agent is no longer the same as selecting an agent, since an agent may get selected by reporting a lower demand, but the assignment he receives is only guaranteed to cover his reported demand, which may not be enough for his true demand. Therefore, we need to modify an outcome o of an allocation algorithm from the indicator variable x k ∈ {0, 1} for each agent k to a specific assignment o k agent k receives (clearly o k = 0 when x k = 0). Let C+ denote all complex numbers in the first quadrant of the complex plane, we have o k ∈ C+ and o ∈ C K + . Now we are able to represent the value agent k derives from an outcome o by his valuation function: . It can also be generalized to settings where the outcome set admits a partial order and a minimum element. As required in the general model of mechanism design, our valuation function only depends on the outcomes, which also justifies the necessity to change our representation of outcomes.
For ease of notation, we let t denote an input, a list of all agents' types ((d k , v k ) : k ∈ K) and denote the input except that of agent k by t −k . Clearly t = (t k , t −k ).
2
A mechanism M = (A, p) consists of an allocation algorithm A computing an allocation solution A(t) ∈ C K + for each input t and a |K|-tuple p(t) for each t where p k (t) ∈ R is the payment enforced on agent k. If d k ≤ A(t) k , we say that agent k is selected, i.e., he receives an assignment that meets his input demand. We represent the set of selected agents as S(A(t)). Given the mechanism, the utility, the overall benefit of agent k, when his true type is t k , equals his valuation minus the payment: u k (t) = t k (A(t)) − p k (t).
As mentioned in Section 1, given the mechanism, each agent may not report his true type for his own benefit. Suppose agent k has true type t k = (d k , v k ) and reports t k = (d k , v k ). Here the outcome of the algorithm A is A(t k , t −k ), but his valuation function remains t k , so he obtains valuation t k (A(t k , t −k )), and his utility is
On the other hand, if he reports his true type, his utility is
. Each selfish agent intends to maximize his utility, so he will choose to misreport t k if it results in higher utility, assuming other agents do not change their input, i.e., u k (t k , t −k ) > u k (t k , t −k ). Therefore, a mechanism is incentive compatible, or truthful, if and only if this can not happen, which is equivalent to saying that, for any agent k, any t −k and any true type t k , truth-telling maximizes agent k's utility, i.e.,
A sufficient condition to ensure truthfulness for single-minded agents is monotonicity, specified as follows in our setting:
Intuitively, in a monotone algorithm, if agent k is selected with demand d k and value v k , he should be also selected when he has smaller demand d k and larger value v k . 3 The following theorem states the sufficiency of monotonicity [2, 8] : 2 Unless specified as the true type, t k may denote any reported type. 3 Note that in this definition, the specific assignments o k are irrele-
We call a mechanism exact if for all inputs t = ((d k , v k ) : k ∈ K) and all agents k, A(t) k is either d k or 0, i.e., either the exact demand is satisfied or nothing is assigned. Without exactness, an agent may benefit from underreporting his demand. It is not difficult to see that we can always modify a truthful mechanism to be exact. After all, exactness is a reasonable assumption since it is undesirable to waste resource in our allocation.
The
By Theorem 2.2, if we are able to design a monotone algorithm, we can transform it into a truthful mechanism. Moreover, the critical value for a given input can be computed in polynomial time by a binary search on interval [0, v k ] for each agent k during which we repeatedly test if k is satisfied by running algorithm A. Therefore, a monotone polynomial time allocation algorithm A implies a polynomial time truthful mechanism.
In addition, the payment function p A (t) guarantees that all agents receive nonnegative utilities. This property, called individual rationality, ensures voluntary participation of the agents, thus is also an important desired property in mechanism design. Therefore, the monotone polynomial time algorithm for C-KP we will present in Section 4 implies a polynomial time mechanism that is both individually rational and incentive compatible.
We need to point out that the mechanism requires the item values {v k } to be integers, because of the binary search needed in the payment computation. This is a reasonable assumption, since values are usually rounded up to the nearest cent or dollar. The approximation algorithm in Section 3 does not need this assumption, since the FPTAS for 1-KP rounds the item values.
APPROXIMATION ALGORITHM FOR C-KP
We present a polynomial-time ( − )-approximation algorithm for C-KP, which relies on a polynomial-time approximation algorithm for 1-KP as a subroutine.
Basic Idea
k of item k is a vector in the first quadrant. A feasible solution of our problem is a subset of items whose sum of demands lies in region D, the 1/4 disk of radius C in the first quadrant. As shown in Fig. 1 , D is divided by chord P Q into a closed triangle D1 and a circular segment D2 = D − D1. The π 4 line intersects chord P Q at point R. Since we may preprocess the demands and eliminate those whose magnitude exceeds capacity C, without loss of generality, we assume all
If we project all demands onto the π 4 line, i.e.,
vant, so in Section 4, we can stay with our original problem formulation when we argue about the monotonicity of our algorithm. we make all demands one-dimensional. Now a subset of demands has sum d k ≤ C/ √ 2 (i.e., the sum vector does not go beyond point R on the line. Therefore, the subproblem on feasible region D1 can be solved by an approximation algorithm for 1-KP with demands changed tod k and capacity to C/ √ 2. On the other hand, the subproblem on feasible region D1 is almost the whole story: First, evidently an optimal solution in D can contain at most one demand in D2; second, if an optimal solution consists of more than one demand, its sum can be broken into either two separate subsums lying in D1, or, the sum of a vector in D2 and a subsum in D1. Our algorithm takes the maximum between an approximate solution for the subproblem on feasible region D1 and an optimal solution on input demands lying in D2. This only reduces the approximation ratio by at most a factor of 2.
Approximation Algorithm
We let Alg
, C] be our algorithm for C-KP, where (d k , v k : k ∈ K) are the complex-valued demands and values of items and C is the capacity. Moreover, we let Alg
, C] be a polynomial-time approximation algorithm for 1-KP, where each demand is real-valued. We describe our algorithm as follows:
In Alg a , we first project all demands onto the π 4
line, and use an approximation algorithm Alg 1d for 1-KP to compute an allocation (denoted by S1) considering the projected demands and capacity C/ √ 2. Then we look at all demands lying in region D2 and choose one with maximum value as solution S2. Note that S2 only consists of a single item. Finally, we compare the total value of solutions S1 and S2 and pick the larger one. All ties are broken arbitrarily.
Analysis
It is evident that our algorithm outputs a feasible solution in polynomial time. For the approximation ratio, our main result is:
-approximation algorithm for C-KP. COROLLARY 3.2. Since 1-KP has an FPTAS [2, 6] , there is a ( PROOF. Let S * be an optimal solution to C-KP, for which the feasible region is D. Let S * 1 , S * 2 be an optimal solution for the subproblem on feasible region D1 and D2 respectively. By our observation in Subsection 4.1, S * 1 is an optimal solution to 1-KP on projected demands and capacity C/ √ 2. Since Alg 1d is a ρ-approximation algorithm to 1-KP, we have v(S1) ≥ ρ · v(S * 1 ). It is also evident that v(S *
) = v(S2).
Next, we analyze the approximation ratio of Alg a in three cases. Here for a subset S ⊆ K, we define
Case (1): (ρ-approximation) We consider an optimal solution S * , such that its sum of demands d(S * ) ∈ D1. This is an easy case where
Case (2): (
-approximation) We consider an optimal solution S * , such that d(S * ) ∈ D2, and there exists an item j ∈ S * whose demand dj ∈ D2.
Let z k∈S * \{j} d k . Thus, d(S * ) = dj + z, i.e., the sum of demands of S * can be written as the sum of a single demand dj and a subset sum z. 4 Note that dj ∈ D2 and z ∈ D1. Otherwise, the projection of d(S * ) = dj + z on the
is an optimal solution for feasible region D1. On the other hand, vj ≤ v(S2) since item j with dj ∈ D2 is a candidate for S2 in our algorithm. We obtain:
By the description of our algorithm, the total value of the output solution
Case (3): ( ρ 2 -approximation) We consider an optimal solution S * , such that d(S * ) ∈ D2, and d k ∈ D1 for every item k ∈ S * .
First, we letd(S) k∈Sd k . The condition on S * is equivalent to the following condition on projected demands on the
We use Lemma 3.3 to show that d(S * ) ∈ D2 can be written as the sum of two demand subset sums in D1. Lemma 3.3 is essentially an equivalent statement of this on the projected demands, and will be proved later in this subsection. LEMMA 3.3. For a set of n positive real numbers a1, ..., an satisfying n i=1 ai ≤ C, ai ≤ C for all i and C ≥ C/ √ 2, there exists a subset T ⊆ {1, ..., n} such that i∈T ai ≤ C and i∈{1,...,n}\T ai ≤ C .
By Lemma 3.3, we haved(T ) andd(S
Combining Cases (1)- (3): min{ρ, ρ/(1 + ρ), ρ/2} = ρ/2, we complete the proof of the approximation ratio of Alg a as ρ/2.
Finally, we prove Lemma 3.3:
PROOF. The case n i=1 ai ≤ C is trivial. Otherwise, let j be the smallest index such that the partial sum exceeds C , i.e.,
The lemma holds if y + z ≤ C , because we can set T = {1, ..., j − 1}.
If y + z > C , then we obtain:
Hence, we can set T = {1, ..., j − 1, j + 1, ..., n}.
MONOTONE APPROXIMATION ALGO-RITHM FOR C-KP
As mentioned in Subsection 2.3, a monotone polynomial time algorithm for C-KP implies an incentive compatible polynomial time mechanism. However, our approximation algorithm Alg a presented in Section 3 does not seem to have an easy proof for monotonicity. In this section, we give a slight modification of Alg a , for which monotonicity becomes immediate and the approximation ratio is preserved.
Basic Idea
In Alg a , monotonicity is not guaranteed due to the comparison between v(S1) and v(S2), the total value of solution S1 and S2. Although we assume Alg 1d for 1-KP is monotone, v(S1) can fluctuate since S1 is an approximate solution. Our trick here is to transform each solution candidate for S2, a single item k with demand d k ∈ D2, to be a solution candidate for S1: an item of the same value whose demand is exactly the capacity limit C/ √ 2 for Alg 1d . These new items will not combine with each other or with any original items to form new solution candidates for S1. Then our new algorithm Alg b only needs to run Alg 1d on the modified set of items to produce a solution for C-KP.
Approximation Algorithm
Recall that we assume every demand
} does exactly the transformation mentioned above: For d k ∈ D1, we simply do the projection onto the π 4 line; otherwise, d k ∈ D2, its projection is larger
√ 2, and we cut it off to C/ √ 2. Then we run Alg 1d on the modified projected demands and outputs the answer.
The following theorem states that our modification of the algorithm does not change the approximation ratio:
-approximation algorithm for C-KP.
The proof of Theorem 4.1 is essentially the same as that of Theorem 3.1. The main difference is that, now instead of an explicit comparison between the solutions S1 and S2 to the two subproblems on region D1 and D2 respectively, our algorithm make it implicit inside the execution of Alg 1d . Therefore, in the formal proof below, we have to define the two subproblems explicitly and show that the total value of our output v(S) ≥ ρ · max{v(S * 1 ), v(S * 2 )}. The case analysis is easy given this inequality. Although Alg a has a better approximation guarantee in terms of the inequality
2 )}, overall, we achieve the same approximation ratio of ρ/2. Just for case (2), we can only prove an approximation ratio of ρ/2, instead of ρ/(1 + ρ) for Alg a .
PROOF. We partition K into two disjoint sets K1 and K2, such that K1 {k ∈ K : d k ∈ D1} and K2 {k ∈ K : d k ∈ D2}. Note that the projection of any demand in K1 onto the π 4 line is at most C/ √ 2, whereas that in K2 is larger than C/ √ 2. Let S1 be the output of Alg b , when the input is K1. Let S2 be the output of Alg b , when the input is K2. Let S * 1 and S * 2 be their corresponding optimal solutions. S * 1 is an optimal solution to 1-KP on projected demands within capacity C/ √ 2, hence is an optimal solution to C-KP on feasible region D1. On the other hand, since each demand in K2 is changed to one exactly equal to the capacity limit of 1-KP, only one of them can be satisfied. Hence S * 2 chooses the one with maximum value S * 2 = {arg max k∈K 2 v k }. Since any demand in K2 will not combine with any in K1 to form new feasible solutions to 1-KP, Alg b outputs either a solution whose sum vector lies in D1 or a singleton set of a demand in K2, which is evidently a feasible solution to C-KP.
Optimally Alg 1d would output arg max{v(S *
Based on this inequality, it is easy to go through the case analysis in the proof of Theorem 3.1 (with slight modifications), hence we omit the rest of the proof here.
On the other hand, our new algorithm is monotone according to Definition 2.1. − )-approximation algorithm for C-KP that runs in polynomial-time in the size of input and 1/ , for any > 0.
INAPPROXIMABILITY FOR C-KP
In this section, we complete the study of C-KP by providing an inapproximability result. We show that C-KP does not admit an FPTAS, unless P = NP.
We remark that it is known there is no FPTAS for 2-KP (see [6] ), which does not have direct implications for C-KP. However, our proof is an extension of the basic idea in the proof for 2-KP.
As in the reduction for 2-KP, we reduce the EQUIPARTITION problem to C-KP:
Given a set of positive integers {w k : k ∈ K}, with |K| = n where n is even, we determine if there is a subset of items S ⊆ K such that |S| = n 2 and
It is well-known that EQUIPARTITION is NP-complete.
THEOREM 5.2. There is no FPTAS for C-KP, unless P = NP.
PROOF. We define a decision version of C-KP with a cardinality objective: given {w k : k ∈ K}, a capacity bound C and a cardinality bound M , we determine if there is a subset of items S such that |S| ≥ M, and
Now we map every instance of EQUIPARTITION to an instance of the C-KP decision problem that always yields the same answer.
Given
As shown in Fig. 2 , the feasible region D for C-KP is the 1 4 disk of radius C in the first quadrant. Since for any subset S ⊆ K,
imposes all solutions to have its sum vector in the halfplane H :
The dividing line of H goes through point P :
) . Our main idea is to set β > 0 such that the dividing line of H coincides with the tangent line at P . Thus we make the intersection of H and D exactly P , which implies |S| = n 2 and k∈S wj = W 2 for any solution S to our reduced C-KP decision problem instance. 5 Note that algorithms are exact under this problem formulation where a solution is specified as the selection of a subset of items. Figure 2 : Reduction of inapproximability.
On the other hand, it is clear that each subset S satisfying conditions of EQUIPARTITION also satisfies conditions of the reduced C-KP decision problem. Therefore, the solution of the reduced C-KP decision problem is equivalent to the solution of EQUIPARTITION. To determine a proper β, since the dividing line of halfplane H goes through P , it coincides with the tangent line at P if and only if they have the same slope, i.e.,
Solving the above equation, we obtain
which is > 0 unless all weights are equal. In this case, we set β = 0, and it is trivially a "yes" instance for both EQUIPARTITION and our C-KP decision problem. So far we have shown the NP-hardness of the C-KP decision problem. So its maximization version, where |S| ≥ M is replaced by max |S|, is NP-hard. We use the standard technique to prove the inapproximability of the maximization version by FPTAS. Suppose that there exists an FPTAS for any > 0 in time polynomial in n and 1/ . Then we choose = 1 n+1
. Let the optimal solution be z * > 0 and that of the approximation solution produced by FPTAS be z A . We obtain:
because z * ≤ n. Moreover, since z * is an integer, this implies that the FPTAS can solve the problem exactly in polynomial time, contradicting the NP-hardness of the problem.
Finally, since the maximization version of C-KP decision problem is a special case of the original C-KP with all v k = 1, there is no FPTAS to C-KP.
APPROXIMATION ALGORITHM FOR GC-KP
We are also able to solve the generalized problem GC-KP, by changing our approximation algorithm Alg a in Section 3. Now, instead of an approximation algorithm Alg 1d for 1-KP as a subroutine, we rely on an approximation algorithm for 3-KP (threedimensional knapsack problem) as a subroutine.
Basic Idea
Now a feasible solution of our problem is a subset of items whose sum of demands lies in the intersection of halfplanes d R ≤ C R , d
I ≤ C I , and the 1/4 disk of radius C in the first quadrant. In the most general case (C R , C I < C), both halfplanes cut the circle, which also cut the original regions D1 and D2 defined in Section 3. Fig. 3 shows the new D1 (polygon P ST QO) and D2. Clearly, the feasible region D is the disjoint union of D1 and D2. Recall that OR is perpendicular to ST and the length of OR is C/ √ 2. If we denote the projection of a demand d k onto line OR byd k , the region D1 corresponds to 3-dimensional linear constraint
Thus the subproblem on feasible region D1 can be solved by a 3-dimensional knapsack algorithm.
On the other hand, the solutions in polygon D1 is almost the whole story by the same reason as in Section 3. Again our algorithm takes the maximum between an optimal solution for the subproblem on feasible region D1 and an optimal solution on input demands lying in D2. This reduces the approximation ratio by at most a factor of 2.
The degenerate cases (C R ≥ C or C I ≥ C or both) can be treated easily by setting T, Q to be the intersection point of the circle and the d R -axis, or setting P, S to be the intersection point of the circle and the d I -axis, or both.
Approximation Algorithm
Let Alg c [(d k , v k : k ∈ K), C, C R , C I ] be our approximation algorithm for GC-KP, where C, C R , C I are the capacity on magnitude, real part and imaginary part of total satisfiable demand respectively. Let Alg
be an approximation algorithm for 3-KP (e.g., from [3] or [6] ). We describe our approximation algorithm to GC-KP as follows:
5: Set S2 = {arg max k∈K:d k ∈D 2 v k } 6: Set S = arg maxS 1 ,S 2 {v(S1), v(S2)} 7: Output S Our Alg c follows the same structure as Alg a for C-KP. The difference is that, for GC-KP, the subproblem on feasible region D1 is equivalent to an instance of 3-KP, since D1 is defined by three halfplanes. And to check if a demand d k lies in region D2, we need to check four inequalities:
